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One of the most natural human traits is our need to imitate. As children we have idols that we 
want to be like when we grow up, in our sports clubs we use the same equipment that famous 
players use, and we go to restaurants that friends have recommended. Imitation is a necessary 
part of the evolutionary process, it prevents us from making the same mistakes as others and 
allows us to learn from each other. 
The phenomenon of imitation and herding is not only important to social aspects of life, 
however, but it also pertains to economic situations. Financial markets are inherently 
susceptible to herding due to the large volume of relevant information and the complex task of 
security analysis
1. Much research has focused on the behavior of institutional investors. This 
type of investors has become more and more important over the years and their investment 
decisions potentially have an impact on security prices, as institutional investors trade large 
volumes at once
2. It is straightforward that herding magnifies trading volumes in a subset of 
securities and, therefore, increases potential price volatility. 
Recent research on institutional herding in stock markets has shown that there is indeed a 
tendency of investors to be on the same side of the market at the same time
3. Apparently, 
institutional investors are not as rational and sophisticated as we expect them to be, relying 
much on interpersonal communication, fads, and rumors. Herding is also found to be a driving 
force behind stock price movements. 
This study aims at searching for evidence of institutional herding in the German bond market. 
The variety and large number of bonds require a different methodological approach than in the 
stock market studies. Institutional investors select bonds with regard to important 
characteristics such as interest rate, maturity, collateral, duration, issuer, and ratings. We 
believe that similar bonds are considered to be equivalent by investors and, hence, we 
construct "bond groups" that comprise bonds with the same salient features. Herding is then 
analyzed at a "bond group" level. The formulation of meaningful criteria for the aggregation 
process clearly constitutes a critical step in our study. The results suggest that herding is an 
observable phenomenon in bond markets, albeit it is weaker than in stock markets. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews theories and models of herding, while in 
section 3 we discuss empirical studies of herding in stock markets. Section 4 describes the 
design of the bond market study, section 5 presents our results, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. THEORIES AND MODELS OF HERDING 
2.1  DEFINITION OF HERDING 
Academics have used various definitions of herding with regard to their respective research 
objectives. Herding has been defined as "a group of investors trading in the same direction 
over a period of time" (Nofsinger and Sias (1998)), "behavior patterns that are correlated 
across individuals" (Devenow and Welch (1996)), and is said to occur when "individuals alter 
their private beliefs to correspond more closely with the  publicly expressed opinions of 
others" (Cote and Sanders (1997)). Clearly, herding implies that individuals behave alike. 
However, this notion of similarity alone is insufficient. Correlated behavior might arise simply 
                                                 
1 Keynes (1936) early used the famous metaphor of the beauty contest to describe the behavior of investors. 
2 The price impact of institutional trading has been studied by Kraus and Stoll (1972b), Harris and Gurel (1986), 
Holthausen et al. (1987), Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995), Teh and de Bondt (1987), Christie and Huang 
(1995), and Nofsinger and Sias (1998). 
3 See Kraus and Stoll (1972a), Lakonishok et al. (1992), Grinblatt et al. (1995), Wylie (1998), Oehler (1998), 
and Wermers (1999). Institutional herding in bond markets 
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by chance or because individuals have access to the same sources of information or interpret 
information similarly. Hence, a further intentional element has to be added that can best be 
circumscribed as social pressure, social learning, imitation, or conformity. The latter has been 
defined by Aronson (1992) as "a change in a person's behavior or opinions as a result of real 
or imagined pressure from a person or a group". Due to this psychological element herding 
then leads to systematic sub-optimal decision-making relative to the best aggregated choice. 
Note that herding does not automatically imply irrational behavior. There are many 
circumstances in which individuals alter their behavior in a rational way as a response to 
perceived social pressure. 
 
2.2  PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS 
The key characteristic of this type of models is that relative performance evaluation and 
reputational concerns of managers or analysts cause principal-agent problems
4. In such a 
setting, agents will herd and mimic the investment decisions or earnings forecasts of other 
agents in order to convey to their principals that they possess superior skills
5. 
The models developed by Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Trueman (1994), and Graham (1999) 
assume that there are  different type of agents. Specifically, there are two agents that 
sequentially have to make an investment decision and both agents have access to privately 
observed signals about the investment payoff. Smart agents receive informative private 
signals, while dumb agents receive purely noisy signals. An agent's compensation depends on 
the principal's assessment of his abilities. The critical assumption is that the informative 
signals of smart agents are correlated, because they are all "observing a piece of the same 
'truth'" (Scharfstein and Stein (1990)), while the noisy  signals of dumb agents are 
uncorrelated. Hence, if an agent mimics the decisions of others, principals will believe that he 
has received a correlated signal and is thus likely to be smart. In addition to this "look-smart"-
effect, there is also a "share-the-blame"-effect of herding. If the decision turns out to be a 
mistake, the agent can share the blame with many others. With correlated informative signals 
there is always an incentive for an agent to herd. 
Zwiebel (1995) presents a model in which agents have different action spaces. There are many 
agents that can undertake an old action (e.g. the industry standard), while a few agents can 
additionally choose to adopt a new action (e.g. a new technology) that stochastically 
dominates the old one. The true values of both actions are unknown, however . Nevertheless, 
the principals have a relatively accurate benchmark for the old action, since they can infer its 
true value due to the large number of agents that undertake it. Conversely, they only have a 
noisy estimate of the new action's true value. Under such conditions, an agent with average 
skills who can choose between both actions will prefer the old action for which a benchmark 
exists. 
Maug and Naik (1995) and Palley (1995) demonstrate that an explicit relative performance 
clause can induce herding. In the model of Maug and Naik (1995), there is one agent A who 
trades on his own account and another agent B who manages a portfolio for a principal. The 
compensation of agent B is an increasing function of the profits he earns and a decreasing 
function of agent A's profits. The formal analysis of the equilibrium shows that under certain 
                                                 
4 Morck et al. (1989) found out that that complete management turnovers are associated with poor performance 
relative to the industry. Palley (1995) and Maug and Naik (1995) suggest that the belief of a manager that his 
promotion and the renewal of his contract depend on the performance of others suffices to implicitly capture the 
element of relative performance evaluation. 
5 Herding among financial analysts has been studied emipircally by Stickel (1990, 1992, 1995), Olsen (1996), 
Cote and Sanders (1999), de Bondt and Forbes (1999), and Welch (1999). Cote and Goodstein (1999) discuss 
ethical implications of analysts' herding. See also Stickel (1992, 1995). Institutional herding in bond markets 
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conditions, agent B will decide to trade in the same asset as agent A. An extension of the 
analysis suggests that in extreme cases agent B will buy even when his own information is 
telling him to sell and vice versa. Palley (1995) discusses a model in which both agents face a 
relative performance clause. This setting leads to a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which the 
portfolio allocations of the two agents are interdependent. 
 
2.3  INFORMATION ACQUISITION MODELS 
This type of models focus on information acquisition patterns of investors. Herding arises 
when all investors choose to study the same assets or sources of information or when investors 
purchase information only if many other investors do.
6 
Short-term trading horizons are the main element of the models by Brennan (1990) and Froot 
et al. (1992). Short-term investors close their positions before fundamental asset values are 
known. This leads to positive informational spillovers: the more other investors trade on the 
same information, the more an investor will earn a profit. The reason is that by the time the 
investor unwinds his position, he will only gain if the information he traded on is incorporated 
into the market price. This will only occur, however, if many other investors traded on the 
same piece of information. Consequently, short-term investors will choose to study sources of 
information that are also widely studied by other investors. 
Hirshleifer et al. (1994) present a model with different types of investors. Some investors 
discover information before others, and these early-informed investors gain by unwinding 
their positions when their information has been impounded into the market price due to the 
trades of late-informed investors. However, ex ante the investors do not know whether they 
are early informed or late informed. The analysis suggests that the expected ex ante utility of 
an investor is an increasing function of the total number of informed investors. Hence, 
investors will herd and acquire the same information. 
 
2.4  INFORMATIONAL CASCADE MODELS 
The notion of informational cascades suggests that the behavior of other individuals conveys 
information to an observing individual. At a certain point, this individual will disregard his 
own information and follow the decisions of others. Subsequent individuals will then find this 
individual's action to be uninformative, which puts them in the same situation, causing them 
to ignore their own information and engage in herding as well
7. 
Further analysis suggests that a cascade must eventually occur and that the probability of a 
cascade is an increasing function of the number of individuals
8. It can also be shown that 
cascades tend to be wrong, i.e. individuals reject although the true value of V is high and vice 
versa
9. As far as welfare properties, informational cascades can therefore be inefficient in an 
ex ante welfare sense
10. The reason is that once an informational cascade starts, no more 
private information is revealed. 
                                                 
6 Calvo and Mendoza (1997) formulate a model in which investors choose not to acquire information to verify 
rumors about asset returns. Golec (1997) provides an empirical example of herding on information acquisition. 
7 The basic model of informational cascades has been developed by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. 
(1992). Welch (1992) presents a similar model in the IPO market and Neeman and Orosel (1999) study 
informational cascades in an auction market. See also Smith and Sørensen (1997, 1999). 
8 See Bikhchandani et al. (1992) 
9 See Bikhchandani et al. (1992). See also Vives (1996) for a discussion on the self-defeating aspect of social 
learning. 
10 See Banerjee (1992). Institutional herding in bond markets 
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Extensions of informational cascade models discuss the role of fashion leaders (Bikhchandani 
et al. (1992, 1998)), the fragility of cascades (Bikhchandani et al. (1992)), the relevance of 
continuos action spaces (Gul and Lundholm (1995), Gale (1996)), the impact of endogenous 
timing (Gul and Lundholm (1995), Zhang (1997)), the existence of multidimensional 
uncertainty (Avery and Zemsky (1995)), and the volatility of the environment (Hirshleifer and 
Welch (1998)). 
 
2.5  BEHAVIORAL MODELS 
This type of models is often referred to as models of "irrational" or "near-rational" herding. 
They use a behavioral approach to analyze issues like investor psychology, interpersonal 
communication, or contagion of interest that are the sources of irrational decision-making. 
There has been some research on the relevance of interpersonal communication. Shiller and 
Pound (1989) undertook questionnaire surveys and found out that investors did not seem to be 
systematic in their buying decisions and that both institutional and individual investors' initial 
interest in a stock was stimulated by other investors. Shiller (1990) also used a survey 
methodology to analyze the behavior of economic actors in speculative environments. His 
results indicate that people react to each other, relying much more on emotion and intuition 
than systematic research. 
Pingle (1995) conducted an experiment on imitation to see when individuals are likely to 
follow others. The results indicate that imitation is more likely when a decision is made for 
the first time, a change in the decision-making environment occurs, and when the decision-
making environment is competitive or challenging.  
Topol (1991) presents a model in which traders that have to set bid/ask prices possess limited 
information sets. Knowing that other traders have different information, a trader will therefore 
herd and adjust his prices relative to other traders' prices. Such a behavior is called mimetic 
contagion and allows the trader to implicitly extend his own information set. Further analysis 
shows that speculative bubbles can be explained by mimetic contagion. 
The model by Lux (1995) explicitly incorporates psychological factors which influence the 
behavior of non-sophisticated traders. These traders do not have access to information about 
fundamental values and, therefore, they have to base their actions on observations of the 
market. Psychological factors are modeled as follows. Traders can either be optimistic or 
pessimistic. Suppose that there is a high proportion of optimistic traders. Because traders are 
non-sophisticated and susceptible to other traders' behavior, it is very likely that the remaining 
pessimistic traders change their attitudes and become optimistic as well. Herding is therefore 
characterized as contagion of sentiment.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF HERDING IN STOCK MARKETS 
3.1  SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 1 provides an overview of six studies that search for evidence of institutional herding in 
stock markets. The studies mainly vary in the sample sizes and the type of trading data used. 
With regard to the latter, only Kraus and Stoll (1972a) use actual trading information. All 
other studies calculate changes in portfolio holdings to serve as proxies for actual transactions. 
Consequently, positions that are opened and closed during a reporting period are not included. 
Furthermore, only herding between two reporting dates can be measured. If funds herd in 
shorter intervals than the frequency of the trading data, the studies are unable to capture it. 
 Institutional herding in bond markets 
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Table 1 – Empirical studies on institutional herding in stock markets 




























Number and type of 
institutional investors 
229 US banks and 
investment 
companies 
769 US pension 
funds 
274 US mutual 
funds 
268 UK mutual 
funds 
28 German mutual 
funds 
Virtually every US 
mutual fund 
Time period  1968-1969  1985-1989  1974-1984  1986-1993  1988-1993  1975-1995 
Type of herding  Market-wide 
herding 
Excess herding  Excess herding  Excess herding  Excess and market-
wide herding 
Excess herding 
Herding measures used  HV  H  H  H  H, HF, HV  H 
Results for excess 
herding 
  Weak evidence 
H = 0.027 
Weak evidence 
H = 0.025 
Weak evidence 
H = 0.026 
Weak evidence 
H = 0.027 
Weak evidence 
H = 0.034 
Results for market-
wide herding 
No evidence        Strong evidence   
 Institutional herding in bond markets 
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3.2  HERDING MEASURES 
The studies essentially use three different measures to explore evidence of herding
11. One 
central herding measure has been defined by Lakonishok et al. (1992). It is formally expressed 
as: 
) ( ) (
) ( ) (
) (
) ( i AF t p
i S i B
i B
i H - -
+
=  
For any period t, B(i) is the number of mutual funds that have bought a stock i and S(i) is the 
number of mutual funds that have sold a stock i. p(t) is the total number of mutual funds 
buying in period t relative to the total number of mutual funds active in period t. AF(i) is an 
adjustment factor and accounts for the fact that under the null hypothesis of no herding the 
first expression can be greater than zero. It therefore represents the expected value of the first 
expression under the null hypothesis of no herding
12. 
A nonzero value for H(i) indicates the degree to which mutual funds herd more in a given 
stock than the trading behavior over all bonds would suggest. In other words,  H(i) only 
measures excess or stock-picking herding
13; if the market as a whole was showing a tendency 
to be on the same side (market-wide herding), it would not be considered to be herding. Such 
a view seems to be consistent with information-based models of herding which explain 
herding with regard to individual stocks. Correlated behavior that is induced by 
noninformational parameters (e.g. a large proportion of buy transactions due to a bullish 
environment) cannot be classified as herding in these models. 
Conversely, principal-agent models and behavioral models suggest that market-wide herding 
be relevant. Due of reputational concerns, investors might buy just because others are buying 
as well; psychological factors provide a possible explanation for general market sentiments 
(optimistic vs. pessimistic) and corresponding behavior. One measure of market-wide herding 
has been defined by Oehler (1998). Herding of Fund managers is expressed as 
) ( ) (
) ( ) (
) (
i S i B





where B(i) is the number of mutual funds that have bought a stock i and S(i) is the number of 
mutual funds that have sold a stock i. In the case of no herding HF(i) would be zero, while a 
value of one indicates that all mutual funds active in a stock i have bought (sold) that stock. 
However, even if HF(i) was zero, there might be a price impact, since it is possible that the 
buyers are making larger trades than the sellers and vice versa. Oehler (1998) therefore defines 
a second measure to analyze Herding corresponding to traded Volume. It is expressed as 
) ( ) (
) ( ) (
) (
i SV i BV





where BV(i) is the volume traded by mutual funds buying a stock i and SV(i) is the volume 
traded by mutual funds selling a stock i. Again, the value range for HV is [0,1]. One limitation 
to the measures HF and HV is the integer-value procedure which doesn't allow to distinguish 
between buy-herding and sell-herding. 
                                                 
11 The original notation in the different studies has been modified in order to ease comparability. 
12 Under the null hypothesis of no herding, in any period t the probability of a randomly selected mutual fund 
being a net buyer is p(t). B(i) follows a binomial distribution with probability p(t) of success, and for a given 
stock i and n active mutual funds 
)) ( 1 ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) (
) (
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A critical assumption of all three herding measures is that the transactions of mutual funds 
follow a binomial distribution: they can either be a buy or a sell transaction. One corollary is 
then that short selling must be possible. Take a mutual fund that has an initial holding in stock 
i of zero. Only if short selling was allowed can this mutual fund be a seller of this stock; 
otherwise he can only be a buyer and his actions would not be binomially distributed. The 
short selling assumption is a very strong one, since in reality only few mutual funds can 
undertake short sales. Wylie (1998) has analyzed the distortion arising from this invalid 
assumption and found out that herding tends to be overstated. This intuitively makes sense, 
since the reason why some mutual funds buy a stock might be that their initial holding was 
zero and that they cannot short sell. The herding measures would then incorrectly interpret this 
behavior as strong evidence of herding. It is necessary to bear this caveat in mind when 
analyzing the results of the different studies. 
 
3.3  FINDINGS 
As far as excess herding, all studies only find relatively weak evidence of such a behavior. 
The level of herding as measured by H varies between 0.025 and 0.034. Herding seems to be 
more pronounced for small stocks, which can be explained by the smaller amount of 
information available for small stocks
14. Increasing the activity level (minimum number of 
trades in a stock) yields contradictory results: Grinblatt et al. (1995) and Wylie (1998) find 
that herding is positively related to the number of mutual funds active, whereas the results in 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Wermers (1999) do not confirm such a relationship. 
The results for market-wide herding are ambiguous. Kraus and Stoll (1972a) come to the 
conclusion that there is no evidence of market-wide herding in their dataset, while Oehler 
(1998) finds strong evidence of market-wide herding. The discrepancy stems from the 
benchmark used in the two studies. Oehler (1998) calculates expected values of HF and HV 
under the null hypothesis of no herding, and the benchmark values are virtually zero. Kraus 
and Stoll (1972a), however, simulate two datasets based on the frequency distributions of the 
original dataset. Since the directions and magnitude of the trades in the simulations are 
determined by chance, HV values for the simulations are then solely due to chance as well. 
The HV values for the original dataset do not vary significantly from these simulated values, 
which is why Kraus and Stoll (1972a) conclude that there is no evidence of systematic 
herding. However, HV values are in fact relatively high (0.255 for large NYSE stocks, 0.640 
for other NYSE stocks, and 0.836 for AMEX stocks), which is supportive of market-wide 
herding. The validity of using simulations as benchmark has therefore to be questioned. 
Additionally, Oehler (1998) finds that market-wide herding is more likely to occur for small 
stocks. Neglecting the simulation approach, the results of Kraus and Stoll (1972a) indicate the 
same phenomenon (HV is higher for AMEX stocks than for large NYSE stocks). 
 
4. DESIGN OF THE BOND MARKET STUDY 
4.1  DATA 
Our analysis is based on a sample of 57 German mutual funds that specialize in DM-
denominated bonds for the three-year period from 1993 to 1995. Each mutual fund reports its 
portfolio holdings twice a year, with June/December and March/September being the most 
                                                 
14 See Zeghal (1984) for a discussion about the informational content of small firms' financial statements and 
Falkenstein (1996) for mutual funds' preferences for certain stock characteristics. 
 Institutional herding in bond markets 
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common reporting dates. We obtained portfolio information from the investment companies 
directly. At the end of 1995, these 57 mutual funds accounted for DM 25 billion, or 71% of 
the total market volume
15. 
Changes in portfolio holdings were calculated and served as proxies for trading volume during 
a half-year. The main limitation to this procedure is that we are not able to detect herding that 
occurs in shorter intervals than a half-year. It was not possible to obtain trading data with 
higher frequency. 
Since the mutual funds had different reporting dates, we had to divide our sample into two 
subsamples. Although most mutual funds had reporting dates in March/September, the largest 
mutual funds reported their portfolio holdings in June and December. 
Our analysis shows that the results are not dependent on when the mutual funds have their 
reporting dates. The following sections therefore only document our findings for mutual funds 
that report their portfolio holdings in June/December. 
 
 
4.2  CATEGORIZATION OF BONDS 
Due to the nature of bonds and the large number of different bonds that are traded, we do not 
expect mutual funds to herd with respect to individual bonds. We believe instead that mutual 
funds base their trading on important characteristics of bonds, such as interest rate, maturity, 
issuer, and collateral. Bonds with the same salient features are then considered to be 
equivalent. Consequently, we aggregate similar bonds and analyze mutual funds' trading of 
these "bond groups". 
With respect to the dataset available, we used the following criteria for the classification of 
bonds: 
 
•  Nominal interest rate 
Categories with intervals of 50 basis points were constructed, which resulted in a total of 21 
different bond groups. Table 2 shows that the majority of bonds have a nominal interest rate 
between 5.50% and 7.00%. 
 
•  Type of quality 
This criteria serves as a proxy for collateral and rating. There are three different 
characteristics. Bonds can be eligible as collateral for a loan as determined by the 
Bundesbank, the German central bank. They can also be eligible as a security for a cover 
fund
16. Finally, bonds can be "gilt-edged". The combination of these three characteristics leads 
to the construction of 8 different bond groups. We can see from Table 2 that most bonds 
exhibit all three characteristics. 
 
•  Time to maturity 
Time to maturity was calculated using January 1993 as reference date. Since our sample only 
includes bonds that were still being traded in 1996, the minimum time to maturity amounts to 
4 years. We obtained 6 bond groups, using the official classification of the Bundesbank. 
Bonds with long times to maturity (more than 15 years) are rare, Table 2 indicates that most 
bonds mature within 4 to 7 years. 
 
                                                 
15 Total market volume at the end of 1995 as estimated by the BVI (German Association of Investment 
Companies) was DM 43 billion. For further details, see BVI (1996). 
16 Detailed eligibility criteria are listed in the Bundesbank Act and Federal Insurance Act. Institutional herding in bond markets 
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•  Type of issuer 
We distinguish between public and private issuers. Public issuers are governments or 
government-sponsored organizations (e.g. European Investment Bank), while private issuers 
comprise mainly banks and industrial companies. Our sample contains an even distribution of 
bonds issued by private and public organizations. 
 
We combine the different criteria to reflect our hypothesis that bonds with the same 
characteristics are considered to be equivalent. This way, we obtained a total of 222 bond 
groups
17, which form the reference dataset for our analysis. 
In order to evaluate which of the four criteria has the greatest impact on herding, we also 
applied the herding measures to datasets in which the bonds were grouped by only one criteria 
at a time. 
 
                                                 
17 Space constraints prevent us from showing a bond distribution table similar to Table 2. Institutional herding in bond markets 
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Type of issuer  Number of 
bonds 
Zerobonds  9  None  100  4 < 6  469  Private  851 
0.01 – 3.00%  1  Collateral (1)  2  6 < 8  532  Public  824 
3.01 – 3.50%  10  Cover fund (2)  26  8 < 10  370     
3.51 – 4.00%  19  Gilt-edged (3)  6  10 < 15  294     
4.01 – 4.50%  35  1 + 2  30  15 < 20  5     
4.51 – 5.00%  88  1 + 3  8  > 20  5     
5.01 – 5.50%  148  2 + 3  43         
5.51 – 6.00%  240  1 + 2 + 3  1460         
6.01 – 6.50%  347             
6.51 – 7.00%  210             
7.01 – 7.50%  112             
7.51 – 8.00%  138             
8.01 – 8.50%  146             
8.51 – 9.00%  74             
9.01 – 9.50%  2             
Floating rate  96             
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4.3  MEASURES OF HERDING 
As discussed earlier in section 3.2, it is necessary to distinguish between excess herding and 
benchmark herding. We use the measure H as defined in Lakonishok et al. (1992) to explore 
evidence of excess herding. In order to capture market-wide herding, we follow Oehler (1998) 
and calculate HF and HV. 
The benchmark value, i.e. the expected value under the null hypothesis of no herding, is 
already incorporated in the H measure through the adjustment factor AF. For HF and HV it is 









where cB is the probability of a mutual fund (trading volume) being a buyer (buying volume) 
and cS the probability of a mutual fund (trading volume) being a seller (selling volume). 
 
4.4  HYPOTHESES 
We have seen in section 3.3 that evidence of herding depends on the type of herding that is 
studied. The findings of Lakonishok et al. (1992), Grinblatt et al. (1995), Wylie (1998), 
Oehler (1998), and Wermers (1999) suggest that there is only weak evidence of excess 
herding in stock markets. Following these studies, we expect to find no evidence of excess 
herding in our dataset (Hypothesis 1). 
Market-wide herding, however, seems to be a relevant phenomenon in stock markets. The 
same should hold true for bond markets and we therefore expect our herding measures to 
detect market-wide herding in our sample (Hypothesis 2). 
Bonds exist in a larger number and a bigger variety than stocks and we account for this fact 
through our categorization of bonds. Yet even with the formulation of bond groups, the 
universe of bonds remains relatively large compared to stocks. Hence, we believe that the 
level of market-wide herding in bond markets is lower than in stock markets (Hypothesis 3). 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1  TRANSACTION VOLUMES AND ACTIVITY LEVELS 
It should be noted at the outset that there are two possible sources of distortion. Table 3 shows 
transaction volumes and activity levels for our sample grouped by nominal interest rate
19. The 
transaction volume for a bond group in a particular period is the total number of buy and sell 
transactions, while the activity level indicates the number of different mutual funds that have 
been active
20. 
We can see from Table 3 that for some bond groups the transaction volume in a period equals 
one, which means that there has only been one transaction. Of course, the activity level must 
be one as well. Calculating HF and HV then yields values of one, suggesting strong evidence 
of herding when in fact there has only been one mutual fund active. Low transaction volumes 
are therefore a source of distortion and lead to an upward bias, overstating the degree of 
herding. 
Furthermore, some bond groups have an activity level of one but a transaction volume larger 
than one. This is possible, because bond groups might comprise bonds in which the same 
                                                 
18 See Oehler (1998). 
19 Transaction volumes and activity levels for bonds grouped by type of quality, time to maturity, and type of 
issuer are presented in the appendix. 
20 The maximum activity level is 26, the total number of mutual funds in our sample. Institutional herding in bond markets 
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mutual fund has been active
21. In such cases, values for HF and HV can also be misleading, 
and the magnitude and direction of distortion depend on the actual mutual fund behavior. Low 
activity levels are hence another source of distortion. 
We account for low transaction volumes by first calculating HF and HV for the original 
dataset. Then we exclude all bond groups and periods with transaction volumes of less than 
two and five, respectively. Values for HF and HV should be lower and reveal the extent of the 
upward bias. 
It is difficult to eliminate the second source of distortion. However, unreported regression 
analysis show that activity levels and transaction volumes are strongly correlated. By 
imposing minimum transaction volumes we therefore simultaneously mitigate the effects of 
low activity levels. 
 
5.2  EXCESS HERDING 
Our results regarding excess herding are presented in Table 4. As we can see, the mean value 
of the herding measure H across all 222 bond groups and all periods amounts to 0.026. This 
value coincides with the findings in previous studies and confirms Hypothesis 1. There is only 
weak evidence of excess herding in bond markets. 
Note that the results differ when we group bonds by only one criteria at a time. Table 4 shows 
that almost no excess herding can be measured when we group bonds by type of quality, time 
to maturity, or type of issuer. Nominal interest rate, however, appears to be a determinant of 
excess herding. The mean value of H across all 16 nominal interest rate groups and all periods 
is 0.118, which is surprisingly large. In order to analyze the reasons for this phenomenon, we 
have summarized the values of H for every nominal interest rate group in Table 5. Apparently, 
excess herding is most relevant for bond groups with either relatively low or relatively high 
nominal interest rates. A possible explanation might be that the number of bond issues with 
low or high nominal interest rates is limited, so that mutual funds interested in purchasing 
low/high interest rate bonds are faced with essentially the same choice. Herding in bonds with 
high nominal interest rates can also be explained by the term structure of interest rates. Figure 
1 shows that interest rates were rapidly declining since 1990. 
 
5.3  MARKET-WIDE HERDING 
5.3.1  OVERALL RESULTS 
Table 6 shows our results for market-wide herding across all 222 bond groups. Values for HF 
and HV have been calculated on the original dataset and on datasets with minimum 
transaction volumes of two and five, respectively. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
Benchmark values for HF and HV under the null hypothesis are virtually zero in all periods. 
We can see that the values of HF for the original dataset vary between 0.751 and 0.862 and 
the average value across all periods is 0.805. HV values are even higher in every period, 
ranging from 0.817 to 0.909. The average HV value across all periods is 0.862. Apparently, 
herding amplifies trading volumes. The T-statistics show that our results are significant at the 
99% confidence level. Clearly, there is strong evidence of market-wide herding, which 
confirms Hypothesis 2. 
                                                 
21 For example, the floating rate bond group generally has high transaction volumes, but low activity levels. The 
reason is that our sample contains a few mutual funds that specialize on floating rate bonds. Institutional herding in bond markets 
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Table 3 – Transaction volumes and activity levels for bonds grouped by nominal interest rate 
  1/93-6/93  7/93-12/93  1/94-6/94  7/94-12/94  1/95-6/95  7/95-12/95 
  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl 
Zerobonds  4  4  6  5  2  1  0  0  1  1  1  1 
0.01 – 3.00%  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
3.01 – 3.50%  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  9  1 
3.51 – 4.00%  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  3  0  20  3 
4.01 – 4.50%  0  0  1  1  10  4  6  1  17  7  28  10 
4.51 – 5.00%  0  0  35  12  29  11  19  6  33  12  44  13 
5.01 – 5.50%  2  1  54  20  47  14  37  10  61  19  79  20 
5.51 – 6.00%  46  16  104  21  45  17  49  15  106  22  137  22 
6.01 – 6.50%  127  21  119  21  48  15  60  19  141  22  169  21 
6.51 – 7.00%  70  19  38  16  30  13  61  18  96  19  94  19 
7.01 – 7.50%  44  15  25  12  11  6  46  12  37  9  33  10 
7.51 – 8.00%  45  12  41  13  11  7  13  6  33  9  41  15 
8.01 – 8.50%  43  13  57  16  21  8  16  6  21  9  48  10 
8.51 – 9.00%  29  12  23  10  15  6  11  4  7  5  21  7 
9.01 – 9.50%  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
Floating rate  44  8  51  4  46  5  60  5  59  6  52  1 
TrnsVol = Transaction volume, ActLvl = Activity level 
 Institutional herding in bond markets 
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Table 4 – Mean values of herding measure H 
  1/93-6/93  7/93-12/93  1/94-6/94  7/94-12/94  1/95-6/95  7/95-12/95  Average 
222 bond groups  0.058  0.062  0.041  -0.020  0.008  0.017  0.026 
Nominal interest rate  0.152  0.225  0.199  0.000  0.015  0.126  0.118 
Type of quality  0.053  -0.050  -0.093  -0.061  -0.078  0.035  -0.036 
Time to maturity  0.007  0.036  -0.060  -0.021  -0.031  0.029  -0.007 
Type of issuer  0.043  0.023  -0.027  0.013  -0.038  -0.010  0.001 
 
Table 5 – Detailed overview of herding measure H for bonds grouped by nominal interest rate 
  1/93-6/93  7/93-12/93  1/94-6/94  7/94-12/94  1/95-6/95  7/95-12/95  Average 
Zerobonds  0.053  0.112  0.070  n/a  0.000  0.072  0.061 
0.01 – 3.00%  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.000  0.000 
3.01 – 3.50%  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.000  0.240  0.120 
3.51 – 4.00%  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.115  0.297  0.206 
4.01 – 4.50%  n/a  0.000  0.210  0.205  0.020  0.207  0.128 
4.51 – 5.00%  n/a  0.293  0.222  -0.015  0.060  0.073  0.127 
5.01 – 5.50%  -0.374  0.322  0.237  -0.013  -0.089  0.020  0.017 
5.51 – 6.00%  0.215  0.282  0.142  -0.070  0.051  0.075  0.116 
6.01 – 6.50%  0.198  0.018  0.097  -0.054  -0.066  -0.053  0.023 
6.51 – 7.00%  0.113  0.157  0.157  0.037  -0.052  -0.046  0.061 
7.01 – 7.50%  -0.106  0.374  0.236  0.090  -0.120  0.160  0.106 
7.51 – 8.00%  0.439  0.376  0.327  -0.211  0.060  0.345  0.223 
8.01 – 8.50%  0.487  0.415  0.305  0.151  -0.031  0.424  0.292 
8.51 – 9.00%  0.458  0.407  0.364  -0.040  0.330  0.222  0.290 
9.01 – 9.50%  0.209  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.000  0.104 
Floating rate  -0.019  -0.057  0.020  -0.085  -0.071  -0.028  -0.040 
n/a indicates that no transaction has occurred. Institutional herding in bond markets 
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Table 6 – Mean values of herding measures HF and HV for all 222 bond groups 
  1/93-6/93  7/93-12/93  1/94-6/94  7/94-12/94  1/95-6/95  7/95-12/95  Average 
Original dataset (minimum transaction volume = 1)           
HF  0.862  0.840  0.842  0.751  0.767  0.790  0.805 
  (28.728)  (28.934)  (27.599)  (21.163)  (26.130)  (28.621)  (64.689) 
HV  0.909  0.892  0.879  0.833  0.817  0.857  0.862 
  (41.304)  (40.230)  (31.504)  (30.285)  (32.568)  (38.873)  (85.638) 
Minimum transaction volume = 2             
HF  0.796  0.766  0.748  0.573  0.619  0.688  0.697 
  (18.862)  (19.233)  (16.729)  (11.459)  (15.397)  (18.594)  (40.078) 
HV  0.866  0.843  0.806  0.713  0.700  0.786  0.785 
  (27.647)  (27.278)  (19.189)  (17.384)  (19.753)  (25.831)  (54.361) 
Minimum transaction volume = 5             
HF  0.759  0.816  0.680  0.400  0.432  0.690  0.637 
  (13.007)  (17.754)  (10.572)  (7.564)  (9.220)  (16.678)  (27.740) 
HV  0.818  0.854  0.739  0.583  0.496  0.728  0.707 
  (16.162)  (21.069)  (10.926)  (11.135)  (9.971)  (17.488)  (32.739) 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses. All results are significant at the 99% confidence level. 
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However, the HF and HV values are surprisingly large. In fact, they exceed the values Oehler 
(1998) calculated in his stock market study
22. This suggests that herding in bond markets is 
stronger than in stock markets, which contradicts our Hypothesis 3. One possible explanation 
for this discrepancy are the two sources of distortion discussed in section 5.1 that potentially 
lead to an overstatement of the level of herding. Table 6 also presents the values of HF and 
HV when we impose hurdles on minimum transaction volumes. HF values range from 0.573 
to 0.796 when the minimum number of transactions is two; the average value across all 
periods is 0.697. Values of HV are lower as well, the average value across all periods is 0.785 
and the values vary between 0.700 and 0.866. When at least five transactions must have 
occurred, HF and HV values continue to decrease. The average HF value across all periods is 
0.637, the corresponding HV value is 0.707. All values are significant at the 99% confidence 
level. 
These findings confirm that low activity levels and low transaction volumes lead to an upward 
bias. Accounting for this bias, we find that the level of market-wide herding in bond markets 
is in fact lower than in stock markets. We therefore accept Hypothesis 3. 
 
5.3.2  RESULTS BY BOND CRITERIA 
Although the four criteria we selected are all important characteristics of bonds, mutual funds 
do not necessarily place an equal weight on them. It is reasonable to assume, for example, that 
nominal interest rates are most important, whereas the type of issuer is less relevant. If mutual 
funds are more influenced by certain bond characteristics than by others, we would expect 
herding to be more pronounced with regard to these characteristics. In order to shed light on 
this issue, we grouped the bonds by only one criteria at a time and calculated HF and HV for 
these datasets. The following sections present our results. 
 
5.3.2.1  NOMINAL INTEREST RATE 
From Table 7 we see that nominal interest rates indeed have a large impact on herding. The 
HF values for the original dataset are between 0.344 and 0.767, with an average value of 
0.610 across all periods. HV values are similarly high, the spread is between 0.429 and 0.802 
and the average value is 0.670. Further analysis show that the results are overstated due to low 
transaction volumes and low activity levels. When we exclude all nominal interest rate groups 
and periods with less than two transactions, the average HF value is 0.571 and the average HV 
value is 0.636. Imposing a hurdle of five transactions further decreases HF and HV values to 
0.560 and 0.629. All values are significant at the 99% confidence level. 
In order to better understand why herding is influenced so much by nominal interest rates, we 
summarized HV values for every nominal interest rate group and every period in Table 8. It 
appears that bonds with low and high nominal interest rates are most susceptible to herding. 
These results correspond with our findings in section 6.2, and low market liquidity and the 
term structure of interest rates again provide possible explanations for mutual funds' proclivity 
for bonds with low/high nominal interest rate. 
 
5.3.2.2  TYPE OF QUALITY 
Herding measures for bonds grouped by type of quality are presented in Table 9. HF values 
for the original dataset range from 0.220 to 0.664, the average value across all periods is 
0.444. Imposing hurdles on transaction volumes leads to average HF values of 0.382 
                                                 
22 HF values range between 0.67 and 0.80, while the spread for HV values is between 0.78 and 0.85. Institutional herding in bond markets 
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(minimum of two transactions) and 0.314 (minimum of five transactions). Values of HV vary 
between 0.202 and 0.747 when calculated for the original dataset. The average HV value is 
0.560 and decreases to 0.511 and 0.464 in the presence of minimum transaction volumes. The 
results suggest that there is some evidence of market-wide herding when we group bonds by 
type of quality. 
Table 10 provides detailed information about HV values for each type of quality group. 
Apparently, mutual funds herd less in bonds which possess all three quality characteristics and 
are thus most secure. Recall from section 4.2 that the vast majority of bonds has all three 
quality characteristics, so herding with regard to type of quality is mainly prevalent in a few 
more risky bonds.  
Although there is some evidence of market-wide herding, the values of HF and HV are lower 
than in the previous section. This suggests that type of quality does play a role, but to a lesser 
extent than nominal interest rate. 
 
5.3.2.3  TIME TO MATURITY 
Results for time to maturity are shown in Table 11. The range of HF values for the original 
dataset is from 0.257 to 0.472, the average value across all periods amounts to 0.370. HV 
values are higher and vary between 0.320 and 0.523, with an average value of 0.446. 
Accounting for the upward bias in the dataset gives average HF values of 0.265 and 0.220 and 
average HV values of 0.353 and 0.323. It seems that herding is less relevant when we group 
bonds by time to maturity. Analyzing HV values in detail, we see from Table 12 that herding 
mainly occurs in bonds with long times to maturity. This can be explained by the low number 
of bond issues with times to maturity that exceed 15 years. 
 
5.3.2.4  TYPE OF ISSUER 
Grouping bonds by type of issuer leads to the formulation of two bond groups for which 
transaction volumes and activity levels are very high
23. It is therefore not necessary to impose 
minimum transaction volumes, since no upwards bias is to be expected. Table 13 presents the 
results for the herding measures HF and HV. 
The values of HF are relatively low, ranging from 0.075 to 0.247. The average value of 0.148 
indicates that there is only weak evidence of market-wide herding. The results for HV confirm 
this suggestion, even if the values are slightly higher. The average HV value is 0.258 and the 
spread is from 0.155 to 0.417. Table 13 also shows HF and HV values for the two type of 
issuer groups. Herding is much more pronounced for bonds issued by private organizations, 
the average HF value for private issues is 0.239 compared to 0.056 for public issues. HV 
values indicate the same discrepancy. Intuitively, bonds issued by public organizations are 
considered to be less risky, since it is very unlikely that a government or a government-
sponsored organization will default. 
                                                 
23 See Table 16 in the appendix. Institutional herding in bond markets 
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Table 7 – Mean values of herding measures HF and HV for bonds grouped by nominal interest rate 
  1/93-6/93  7/93-12/93  1/94-6/94  7/94-12/94  1/95-6/95  7/95-12/95  Average 
Original dataset (minimum transaction volume = 1)           
HF  0.704  0.767  0.759  0.344  0.446  0.643  0.610 
  (6.520)  (9.508)  (10.383)  (3.814)  (4.370)  (7.078)  (14.985) 
HV  0.802  0.764  0.754  0.429  0.549  0.716  0.670 
  (8.695)  (7.632)  (9.023)  (5.148)  (5.443)  (8.737)  (17.175) 
Minimum transaction volume = 2             
HF  0.675  0.746  0.759  0.344  0.354  0.561  0.571 
  (5.875)  (8.747)  (10.383)  (3.814)  (3.741)  (5.697)  (13.584) 
HV  0.783  0.742  0.754  0.429  0.474  0.650  0.636 
  (7.853)  (6.933)  (9.023)  (5.148)  (4.638)  (7.089)  (15.578) 
Minimum transaction volume = 5             
HF  0.719  0.746  0.738  0.344  0.295  0.561  0.560 
  (6.878)  (8.747)  (9.647)  (3.814)  (3.633)  (5.697)  (13.274) 
HV  0.853  0.742  0.732  0.429  0.427  0.650  0.629 
  (14.491)  (6.933)  (8.294)  (5.148)  (4.306)  (7.089)  (15.316) 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses. All results are significant at the 99% confidence level. 
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Table 8 – Detailed overview of herding measure HV for bonds grouped by nominal interest rate 
  1/93-6/93  7/93-12/93  1/94-6/94  7/94-12/94  1/95-6/95  7/95-12/95  Average 
Zerobonds  1.000  0.082  1.000  n/a  1.000  1.000  0.816 
0.01 – 3.00%  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  1.000  1.000 
3.01 – 3.50%  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  1.000  1.000  1.000 
3.51 – 4.00%  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  1.000  1.000  1.000 
4.01 – 4.50%  n/a  1.000  1.000  1.000  0.915  0.856  0.954 
4.51 – 5.00%  n/a  1.000  0.842  0.498  0.177  0.768  0.657 
5.01 – 5.50%  0.000  1.000  0.859  0.262  0.288  0.380  0.465 
5.51 – 6.00%  0.960  0.965  0.708  0.225  0.628  0.448  0.656 
6.01 – 6.50%  0.627  0.705  0.194  0.165  0.205  0.347  0.374 
6.51 – 7.00%  0.860  0.135  0.682  0.364  0.236  0.186  0.411 
7.01 – 7.50%  0.588  0.956  0.966  0.339  0.210  0.650  0.618 
7.51 – 8.00%  0.982  0.948  1.000  0.311  0.112  0.952  0.717 
8.01 – 8.50%  1.000  0.921  0.249  0.909  0.740  1.000  0.803 
8.51 – 9.00%  1.000  1.000  1.000  0.412  1.000  0.806  0.870 
9.01 – 9.50%  1.000  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  1.000  1.000 
Floating rate  0.810  0.450  0.554  0.236  0.181  0.058  0.381 
n/a indicates that no transaction has occurred. 
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Table 9 – Mean values of herding measures HF and HV for bonds grouped by type of quality 
  1/93-6/93  7/93-12/93  1/94-6/94  7/94-12/94  1/95-6/95  7/95-12/95  Average 
Original dataset (minimum transaction volume = 1)           
HF  0.664  0.445  0.449  0.460  0.220  0.488  0.444 
  (4.087)  (2.998)  (2.784)  (2.866)  (3.659)  (3.070)  (7.511) 
HV  0.747  0.654  0.652  0.607  0.202  0.550  0.560 
  (4.239)  (5.395)  (5.870)  (3.982)  (3.932)  (3.902)  (9.998) 
Minimum transaction volume = 2             
HF  0.664  0.445  0.358*  0.244**  0.220  0.402*  0.382 
  (4.087)  (2.998)  (2.276)  (2.113)  (3.659)  (2.538)  (6.719) 
HV  0.747  0.654  0.594  0.450*  0.202  0.474  0.511 
  (4.239)  (5.395)  (5.302)  (2.726)  (3.932)  (3.366)  (9.035) 
Minimum transaction volume = 5             
HF  0.664  0.223  0.287**  0.244**  0.201  0.283*  0.314 
  (4.087)  (4.021)  (2.339)  (2.113)  (2.977)  (2.217)  (6.160) 
HV  0.747  0.515  0.557  0.450*  0.211  0.369  0.464 
  (4.239)  (4.345)  (5.199)  (2.726)  (3.550)  (3.210)  (8.122) 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses. Results are significant at the 95%, 90%(*), and 85%(**) confidence level. 
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Table 10 – Detailed overview of herding measure HV for bond7s grouped by type of quality 
  1/93-6/93  7/93-12/93  1/94-6/94  7/94-12/94  1/95-6/95  7/95-12/95  Average 
None  0.860  0.296  0.449  0.104  0.270  0.313  0.382 
Collateral (1)*  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Cover fund (2)  1.000  0.735  1.000  0.904  0.057  0.253  0.658 
Gilt-edged (3)  n/a  1.000  0.333  1.000  0.143  1.000  0.695 
1 + 2  0.818  0.860  0.809  0.693  0.016  0.285  0.580 
1 + 3  n/a  1.000  1.000  1.000  0.398  1.000  0.880 
2 + 3  1.000  0.403  0.646  0.500  0.245  0.820  0.602 
1 + 2 + 3  0.057  0.283  0.324  0.051  0.282  0.175  0.196 
n/a indicates that no transaction has occurred. * Bonds in this group were bought before 1993 and held throughout our sample period. Institutional herding in bond markets 
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Table 11 – Mean values of herding measures HF and HV for bonds grouped by time to maturity 
  1/93-6/93  7/93-12/93  1/94-6/94  7/94-12/94  1/95-6/95  7/95-12/95  Average 
Original dataset (minimum transaction volume = 1)           
HF  0.399*  0.472  0.298*  0.357*  0.257  0.439*  0.370 
  (2.453)  (2.704)  (2.055)  (2.256)  (3.050)  (2.458)  (6.219) 
HV  0.414*  0.514  0.523  0.464  0.320  0.435*  0.446 
  (2.364)  (3.122)  (4.422)  (2.727)  (4.462)  (2.383)  (7.656) 
Minimum transaction volume = 2             
HF  0.249*  0.472  0.158  0.228**  0.257  0.159  0.265 
  (3.075)  (2.704)  (3.517)  (2.025)  (3.050)  (4.687)  (5.684) 
HV  0.268**  0.514  0.427  0.357*  0.320  0.152*  0.353 
  (2.158)  (3.122)  (5.004)  (2.204)  (4.462)  (2.587)  (6.960) 
Minimum transaction volume = 5             
HF  0.249*  0.367*  0.158  0.228**  0.135*  0.159  0.220 
  (3.075)  (2.151)  (3.517)  (2.025)  (2.487)  (4.687)  (5.366) 
HV  0.268**  0.417*  0.427  0.357*  0.258  0.152*  0.323 
  (2.158)  (2.561)  (5.004)  (2.204)  (3.895)  2.587  6.506 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses. Results are significant at the 95%, 90%(*), and 85%(**) confidence level. 
 Institutional herding in bond markets 
 
26
Table 12 – Detailed overview of herding measure HV for bonds grouped by time to maturity 
  1/93-6/93  7/93-12/93  1/94-6/94  7/94-12/94  1/95-6/95  7/95-12/95  Average 
4 < 6  0.404  0.121  0.419  0.286  0.285  0.097  0.269 
6 < 8  0.549  0.169  0.428  0.207  0.430  0.025  0.301 
8 < 10  0.058  0.255  0.164  0.063  0.124  0.189  0.142 
10 < 15  0.060  0.539  0.422  0.242  0.193  0.298  0.292 
15 < 20  n/a  1.000  1.000  1.000  0.276  1.000  0.855 
> 20  1.000  1.000  0.704  0.987  0.610  1.000  0.884 
n/a indicates that no transaction has occurred. 
 
Table 13 – Herding measures HF and HV for bonds grouped by type of issuer 
  1/93-6/93  7/93-12/93  1/94-6/94  7/94-12/94  1/95-6/95  7/95-12/95  Average 
Mean values           
HF  0.247  0.163  0.140  0.142  0.119*  0.075  0.148* 
  (1.263)  (1.134)  (1.826)  (1.612)  (7.949)  (1.244)  (1.609) 
HV  0.238  0.312  0.417  0.155  0.272*  0.155  0.258* 
  (2.125)  (2.690)  (3.552)  (1.194)  (7.451)  1.085  (2.390) 
Herding measure HF by type of issuer group           
Private  0.443  0.306  0.216  0.231  0.104  0.135  0.239 
Public  0.051  0.019  0.063  0.054  0.134  0.015  0.056 
Herding measure HV by type of issuer group           
Private  0.350  0.427  0.535  0.285  0.308  0.297  0.367 
Public  0.126  0.196  0.300  0.025  0.235  0.012  0.149 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 85% confidence level; all other results are insignificant.  




This study aims at analyzing institutional herding in the German bond market. With regard to 
the large number of bonds, we categorize bonds according to four different criteria and study 
the investment behavior of mutual funds in these bond groups. Our results closely mirror the 
findings of previous studies in the stock market. We find that there is only weak evidence of 
excess or bond-picking herding, while market-wide herding appears to be a relevant 
phenomenon. However, the degree of herding is lower than in the stock market, which can be 
attributed to the big variety of bonds that remains despite our categorization. Detailed analysis 
suggests that the nominal interest rate is the most important bond characteristic to mutual 
funds. Type of quality and time to maturity also seem to play a role in the bond selection 
process, but only to a lesser extent. The type of issuer seems to be irrelevant. 
The time period of our study is also relatively short and only allows us to indicate a trend. 
This limitation is further exacerbated by the low frequency of portfolio data (semi-annual 
portfolio holdings) and the necessity to substitute changes in portfolio holdings for trading 
data. A more comprehensive sample over a longer period of time should provide more 
differentiated evidence of herding. 





Table 14 – Transaction volumes and activity levels for bonds grouped by type of quality 
  1/93-6/93  7/93-12/93  1/94-6/94  7/94-12/94  1/95-6/95  7/95-12/95 
  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl 
None  40  13  57  16  37  9  35  10  43  11  46  12 
Collateral (1)*  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Cover fund (2)  5  3  7  6  4  1  5  4  10  5  15  7 
Gilt-edged (3)  0  0  4  4  2  1  1  1  3  3  3  1 
1 + 2  10  5  13  8  11  1  14  5  19  5  16  5 
1 + 3  0  0  3  1  1  0  1  1  5  3  1  1 
2 + 3  13  7  5  4  5  4  8  3  10  5  25  8 
1 + 2 + 3  387  24  465  25  255  26  314  25  526  26  672  26 
TrnsVol = Transaction volume, ActLvl = Activity level. * Bonds in this group were bought before 1993 and held throughout our sample period. 
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Table 15 – Transaction volumes and activity levels for bonds grouped by time to maturity 
  1/93-6/93  7/93-12/93  1/94-6/94  7/94-12/94  1/95-6/95  7/95-12/95 
  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl 
4 < 6  100  17  133  23  74  15  128  21  187  20  179  21 
6 < 8  115  22  133  22  101  14  114  19  196  23  213  23 
8 < 10  118  20  138  21  52  17  66  17  86  18  218  22 
10 < 15  121  20  142  20  79  18  63  14  139  19  166  23 
15 < 20  0  0  2  1  1  1  1  1  4  4  1  1 
> 20  1  1  6  6  8  7  6  4  4  4  1  1 
TrnsVol = Transaction volume, ActLvl = Activity level 
 
 
Table 16 – Transaction volumes and activity levels for bonds grouped by type of issuer 
  1/93-6/93  7/93-12/93  1/94-6/94  7/94-12/94  1/95-6/95  7/95-12/95 
  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl  TrnsVol  ActLvl 
Private  183  24  242  25  125  23  156  18  288  23  370  24 
Public  272  23  312  25  190  25  222  24  328  26  408  25 
TrnsVol = Transaction volume, ActLvl = Activity level 
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